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Will the BART Bond Fund Pensions?

This fall, voters in San Francisco, Alameda and Contra Costa counties will consider a $3.5 billion BART bond measure. Proponents argue that the measure is required to ensure the system’s safety and reliability. Critics are concerned that bond proceeds will be used to support excessive employee salaries and benefits.

BART management denies that claim. In an August 12 press release, BART management stated, “Not one penny, under any circumstance, can or will be used to pay for operating expenses, salaries, or benefits.” Indeed, using bond proceeds for such purposes would be illegal.

But there is an indirect way of using the bond to increase employee compensation. As Daniel Borenstein reports in The East Bay Times, BART currently devotes about 16% of its operating revenue to capital improvements. Once the bond measure passes, BART could reduce the amount of operating revenue it devotes to capital purposes, backfilling the shortfall with bond proceeds. BART management insists that it will not perform this sleight of hand, stating in its release:

To suggest we would use the money for salaries and benefits directly or “indirectly” is flat out wrong.  Cutting spending from the Capital Investment Plan in order to increase salaries would undo decades of financial projections and do immense damage to BART’s capacity to improve in the future.

Borenstein is unconvinced, noting that BART directors and staff have refused to make a commitment to continue the 16% annual operating revenue transfers. And the Times editorial board shares their columnist’s concern:  they have now advocated a no vote on the BART bond.

No one can be certain whether BART management or its critics will be correct, but it is useful to review the data on BART’s operating cost pressures. If BART management can’t restrain the growth in operating costs and are unwilling to offset these costs at the farebox, they will be obliged to skimp on capital investments.

As Chart 1 shows, BART labor expenses have risen sharply over the last five years. Budgeted labor costs have increased from $364.3 million to $499.6 million between FY 2012 and FY 2017, representing a constant annual growth rate of 6.52%. The amounts shown come from annual budget resolutions posted on BART’s web site.

Chart 1

Chart 1

Pension benefits are major sources of cost pressure. The system’s safety plan, administered by CalPERS, is only 63.3% funded. The employer contribution rate rose from 47.9% in Fiscal 2015 to 56.5% in the current fiscal year, and will rise again to 57.4% in Fiscal 2018. Most BART employees are in the system’s Miscellaneous employee plan. Contribution rates for this plan are lower but also escalating.

Chart 2 shows total BART employer pension contributions for the fiscal years ending June 30, 2014 through June 30, 2023 as projected in the most recent CalPERS actuarial reports. The projections beyond 2018 rely on optimist assumptions that CalPERS assets will return 7.5% and that BART’s covered payroll will rise by 3% annually. Still we see BART’s contributions rising from $35.7 million in Fiscal 2014 to $99 million in Fiscal 2023.

Chart 2

Chart 2

BART’s employer contributions are so high because benefits are generous and the retirement plan is carrying a lot of beneficiaries. BART police hired before December 30, 2014 are able to retire at age 50 with pensions of up to 90% of final salary. Newly hired PEPRA members must wait until age 57 and can only get up to 81% of final salary. PEPRA’s implementation for BART employees was delayed by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) because PEPRA interfered with collective bargaining. Citing Section 13c of the Urban Mass Transit Act, DOL refused to certify federal grants to BART if PEPRA was implemented. A Federal District Court overruled DOL, but the federal agency is continuing to challenge PEPRA on other grounds. (For more on this, see page 16 of BART’s 2017 Resource Manual).

As of June 30, 2015, the BART Safety plan had 275 beneficiaries – almost half again the number of active members. Many of the beneficiaries are under age 50, having earned retirement benefits due to disability.

Many retired safety and management employees draw very generous pensions. According to Transparent California data, 112 BART beneficiaries received $100,000 or more in 2015. Like many public employees, BART staff members are not eligible for social security, but unlike most agencies, BART provides an offsetting benefit. Employees can contribute to a 401(a) Money Purchase Pension Plan and receive an employer match. BART employees thus have a plan similar to a 401(k) on top of their generous defined benefit pension.

In addition to pensions, BART offers Other Post-Employment Benefits (OPEBs) including medical benefits to retirees and surviving spouses, retiree life insurance and survivor dental and vision benefits.  According to its most recent audited financial statements, these benefits cost BART $26 million in Fiscal Year 2015. On the plus side, BART has pre-funded a large portion of its OPEB obligation. Further, BART’s actuary has found that an increasing proportion of eligible retirees and spouses are not participating in the OPEB plan, reducing the rate of cost growth. In fact, BART expects to pay less for OPEBs in Fiscal 2017 than it did in in Fiscal 2016. (For more on this, see page 19 of BART’s 2017 Resource Manual). But if medical cost inflation picks up in the years ahead and more beneficiaries take advantage of BART’s OPEB benefits, the system could experience rapid increases in its OPEB expenditures.

In summary, it is impossible to know whether BART will fulfill its stated intention of maintaining the current flow of operating revenues to capital needs, thereby avoiding a scenario under which bond proceeds are effectively diverted. We do know, however, that the system faces high and rising labor costs. Looking into the future, it is all but certain that pension costs will rise rapidly given current underfunding and the generosity of benefits. These escalating pension expenditures will be a source of pressure on the BART board to scale back much-needed maintenance expenditures.

Michigan Court: Reduce Pensions or Reduce Retirement Health Benefits

Editor’s Note: Notwithstanding recent court challenges that could go either way, one way to negotiate meaningful steps towards financially sustainable defined benefit pensions, i.e., reductions or suspensions of COLAs, prospective reductions in the multiplier, increased employee contributions towards the unfunded liability and not just towards the normal contribution, etc., is to offer to reduce OPEB (other post employment benefits) instead. From Detroit to Stockton, this option has been part of the discussion. The scale of OPEB liabilities are comparable to unfunded pension liabilities, in some cases, they actually exceed unfunded pension liabilities. But in general, cities, counties and states can exercise more discretion with OPEB commitments when their agencies face severe financial stress than they can with pensions. Leverage is scarce in the world of pension reform, and OPEB is being used. In this article, author Mike Shedlock reports on how this is playing out in Michigan and Illinois – something to be watched closely in California.

Illinois state pension and retirement plans are in dire straits. The only way to fix the problems is with plan changes.

Michigan did that in 2012. And in a 6-0 decision yesterday, the Detroit Free Press reported the Michigan Supreme Court, rejected arguments from unions, and upheld the 2012 state law requiring teachers to put more of their pay toward their pension plans or face cuts to benefits.

The Michigan Supreme Court, rejecting arguments from unions, has upheld a 2012 state law requiring teachers and other school employees to put more of their pay toward their pension plans or face cuts to benefits such as post-retirement health care.

The law, backed by Gov. Rick Snyder and the Republican-controlled Legislature, was intended to cut an estimated $45-billion unfunded liability in the Michigan Public School Employees Retirement System by more than $15 billion.

The American Federation of Teachers and the Michigan Education Association unions argued the law impaired contracts and amounted to uncompensated takings of pension benefits.

But both the Michigan Supreme Court and the appeals court said the law doesn’t violate a Michigan constitutional provision protecting earned pension benefits, because only future benefits are affected. Also, unlike an earlier law that mandated 3% contributions toward health care, the 2012 law provides an opt-out provision, the court said.

Good News For Illinois

What passes constitutional muster in Michigan may not do so in Illinois, but the unanimous ruling provides a model for what may work elsewhere. This is good news for all cash-strapped states.

In Illinois, Gov. Bruce Rauner Wants Changes to Insurance Programs for State Workers, Retirees.

Health insurance for active state workers and retirees is being targeted for big savings in Gov. Bruce Rauner’s budget plan.

“By bringing health care benefits more in line with those received by the taxpayers who pay for them, we save an additional $700 million,” Rauner said Wednesday in his budget speech.

His budget also calls for an end to state subsidies to the health insurance programs for retired downstate teachers and community college workers.

Right Path

Governor Rauner is on the right path. Benefits must be cut. For starters, Illinois needs to move all employees going forward into 401K type plans. Next, Illinois needs to address spiraling costs for those in defined benefit plans.

Michigan passed one law the Michigan Supreme Court rejected, and a second one in 2012 law that was upheld unanimously. Illinois would be wise to pursue changes that are likely to be upheld in court. We now have at least one model that works.

For more on problems in Illinois and what to do about them, please see …

Illinois desperately needs to address the root of its fiscal problems: untenable pension benefits and promises.

Massive proposed tax hikes are not the answer. Tax hikes will do nothing but make already uncompetitive Illinois even more uncompetitive.

About the Author:  Mike Shedlock is the editor of the top-rated global economics blog Mish’s Global Economic Trend Analysis, offering insightful commentary every day of the week. He is also a contributing “professor” on Minyanville, a community site focused on economic and financial education, and a senior fellow with the Illinois Policy Institute.

Evaluating Total Unfunded Public Employee Retirement Liabilities in 20 California Counties

Summary:  Using officially reported figures from the most recent financial statements available, this report calculates the total unfunded employee retirement liabilities for the 20 California counties with their own independent retirement systems. This study is the first of its kind to compile for these counties not only reported pension fund assets and liabilities, but also retirement health care assets, if any, and their corresponding liabilities, as well as the outstanding balances for any pension obligation bonds.

This composite data, reported for each county both as a funding ratio and as a numerical value for the net liability, incorporates all assets and liabilities associated with retirement obligations to public employees. To-date, most reports focus on the unfunded pension liability, ignoring the amount of the unfunded healthcare liability and the outstanding balance owed on pension obligation bonds. But these other liabilities are of comparable value, and are offset with far fewer invested assets, if any. For taxpayers and policymakers to properly understand and cope with the financial challenges facing their counties, this information is vital.

As it is, these 20 counties combined have a population of 29.3 million, constituting 77% of Californians. Their total unfunded pension liability, based on their most recent financials, is $37.2 billion. Their total unfunded retirement liabilities, also based on officially reported amounts in their most recent financial statements, but also including pension obligations bonds and unfunded healthcare liabilities, is $72.3 billion. As a percentage, their total funded ratio just for pensions (assets as a percent of liabilities) is 74%. Their total retirement funding percentage, taking into account pensions, healthcare, and pension obligation bonds, is only 60%.

This total obligation, $7,369 per household vs. $3,932 if you only include pension funds, is a daunting amount. But it is based on official rates of return of 7.5%, which as explained further in this study, if not attained, will result in far higher calculations of underfunding for pensions – at a 5.5% discount rate, for example, the funded ratio for these 20 counties drops to 49%. And, of course, it only represents the costs for county workers – within these counties, taxpayers are also responsible for the unfunded pension and healthcare liabilities – and retirement related bond debt – for those working for the local cities, as well as all workers within their counties who are employed by public schools, local colleges and universities, other public agencies, and the state.

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INTRODUCTION

The concept of “total compensation” has become increasingly recognized as the only accurate way to assess whether or not public employee compensation is either affordable or equitable. Instead of just reporting base pay, total compensation calculations look at all types of direct pay including “credential pay,” “specialty pay,” “bilingual pay,” “advanced degree pay,” “tuition reimbursement,” etc., along with overtime pay, and along with the costs for all employer paid benefits including current health insurance coverage. “Total compensation” calculations also include current year contributions made by an employer towards an employee’s retirement benefits – namely, health insurance and pensions.

“Total compensation,” as it turns out, often exceeds “base pay” by a factor of 100% to 200%.

Discussions of unfunded liabilities for retirement benefits must undergo a similar examination. To-date, the primary topic of debates and discussion over the size of unfunded liabilities regards pensions, and on what discount rate to use to calculate the present value of the employer’s future retirement pension obligations.

This debate is ongoing and of critical importance – to use very rough numbers, each 1.0% drop in the projected rate-of-return for a typical pension fund can increase the required annual contribution by roughly 10% of payroll. Similarly, using very rough numbers, as documented in a February 2013 CPC study entitled “How Lower Earnings Will Impact California’s Total Unfunded Pension Liability” – using formulas provided by Moody’s Investors Services for this purpose, and data provided by the California State Controller. Bearing in mind that a relatively small change to the total liability may result in a very large change to the net unfunded liability – here is the impact of changes to the projected rate of return on the total unfunded liability for all of California’s public employee pension systems combined using annual report data from 6-30-2012:

Official total unfunded pension liability at assumed rate-of-return of 7.5% = $128 billion.

Official total unfunded pension liability at assumed rate-of-return of 6.2% = $252 billion.

Official total unfunded pension liability at assumed rate-of-return of 5.5% = $329 billion.

Official total unfunded pension liability at assumed rate-of-return of 4.5% = $450 billion.

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TOTAL UNFUNDED PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT LIABILITY

The purpose of this study is not to present the consequences of lower rates of return, but instead to calculate – using the officially recognized composite rate of return of 7.5% – what the total unfunded public employee retirement liability is, using information provided by independent pension systems serving select California counties. There are 20 counties that administer their own independent pension systems under the “County Employee Retirement Law;” this study draws on information provided in the Consolidated Annual Financial Reports for these counties, as well as in the County Employee Retirement Systems annual Actuarial Valuation reports.

Using official numbers has the virtue of being relatively beyond debate – when using the official projections, the only question anyone should be asking is how much higher these numbers may be using lower estimated rates-of-return. But total public unfunded employee retirement liabilities do not just include unfunded pension liabilities, they also include unfunded retirement health insurance liabilities – the so-called “OPEB” (Other Post-Employment Benefits). Total unfunded public employee retirement obligations must also include the outstanding balances on Pension Obligation Bonds – balance sheet debt, usually long-term that was entered into by cities and counties in order to raise cash to make their required employer pension contributions to their pension funds.

By combining all three sources of liability for retirement obligations, a far more accurate picture of just how much taxpayers owe – even at the official rate-of-return projections which may turn out to be far too optimistic. By matching these liabilities against the assets on hand – pension fund assets and in some cases OPEB fund assets – the next table shows the true “unfunded” ratio for the 20 CERL counties.

Table 1 – Total Unfunded Retirement Liability per CERL Counties ($=Millions)

20140506_Churchill-Monnett_1

Showing this number adds a sobering perspective to the discussion of unfunded retirement liabilities. The counties on the above table are ranked with those counties having the worst funded ratios appearing first. As can be seen, there is a wide variation between the worst, Merced, where less than half the necessary amount to fund already earned pension and retirement healthcare benefits has actually been set aside, and Tulare, which is has a healthy 87% funded ratio.

It is important to emphasize that all these numbers reflect officially recognized liabilities. It would be instructive to provide data on just how much these unfunded liabilities will swell if any sort of projection is made based on lower rates of return. Here’s the formula that Moody’s Investor Services provided to revalue the present value of pension liabilities from the common 7.5% rate of return projection based on using a more conservative rate of 5.5%:

[ PV x ( 1 + official %i ) ^ years ] / ( 1 + adjusted %i ) ^ years  =  Adj PV

Here, plugging into the formula the official total pension liability for all 20 CERL counties of $143 billion, is how much it grows at the lower discount rate of 5.5%:

[ 143.2 x ( 1 + 7.5% ) ^ 13 ]  /  ( 1 + 5.5% ) ^ 13  =  182.8

Collectively, for the CERL counties, using this formula to apply the more conservative discount rate of 5.5%, their estimated pension liabilities grow from $143.2 billion to $182.8 billion, which means their estimated funded ratio for pensions (not including pension obligation bonds) drops from 74% to 58%. Put another way, since the unfunded pension liability is equal to the total assets less the estimated pension liabilities, by using the more conservative discount rate of 5.5%, they more than double, from $37.3 billion to $76.8 billion. The 20 CERL pension systems have had similar earnings rate during this period. The potential for surprises like this should not be lightly dismissed. In spite of recently reported good results, note that 5.5% is in fact the cumulative investment rate of return earned by CalPERS during the 13 years from 2001 to 2013.

[Note: This recent CPC study “A Method to Estimate the Pension Contribution and Pension Liability for Your City or County,” provides a tutorial, including a downloadable spreadsheet, explaining how use Moody’s pension analysis formulas to analyze any typical public sector pension fund.] 

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PAYING DOWN THE TOTAL UNFUNDED RETIREMENT LIABILITY

Another way to explain the significance of the total unfunded retirement liability would be to describe what repayments would be based on the goal to achieve 100% funded status in 20 years. The next table shows these payments as a percent of their respective county budgets, using 2012 budget data compiled from publicly available information by the website PublicSectorCredit.org.

The order of the counties on this table are ranked with the worst counties, i.e., those with the highest payments on their unfunded liability as a percent of revenue listed first. Even though Los Angeles County has only the 2nd lowest unfunded liability, at 51%, 2nd to Merced County at 47%, Los Angeles County’s unfunded liability as a percent of their annual budget is actually greater.

As shown in the 3rd column “Liability as Multiple of Revenue,” Los Angeles County’s officially recognized total retirement liability is 2.37 times their entire annual revenue. As a payment calculated to bring the county to 100% funding by 2034, they would have to make an unfunded “catch-up” payment each year equivalent to 23% of their annual revenue.

Table 2 – Unfunded Payment as Percent of Revenue per CERL Counties ($=Millions)

20140506_Churchill-Monnett_2b

As can be seen in the above table, these so-called “unfunded payments,” for which reforms to-date do not require public employees to bear any share of payment on via payroll withholding, will themselves consume a significant portion of the entire budget of many counties – if serious attempts are made to actually achieve 100% funding. And without 100% funding, the pool of invested assets is too small to prevent the unfunded liability from growing further even if rate-of-return projections are fulfilled. Here’s why:

In the projections shown on the above table, a 7.5% rate of interest is used – this rate represents the opportunity cost of not having 100% funding. For example, Ventura County has a funded ratio of nearly 80%, purportedly the threshold for a “healthy” fund. But because they are earning money on invested assets that only amount to 80% of the present value of their estimated retirement liabilities, if all they do is earn 7.5% in a given year, their unfunded liability will grow. Because to 7.5% earnings on a 100% funded plan is equivalent to 9.4% earnings on an 80% funded plan. And so it goes.

While the math behind all of this may only seem obvious to those who understand financial concepts and are proficient at algebra, the point of it all should be obvious to everyone: For the CERL counties to improve their funded ratio for their total retirement obligations, which collectively – using officially reported numbers – is already only 60%, they will have to make annual unfunded payments that will by themselves consume a significant portion of their budgets, in addition to the normal funding contributions for new benefits earned in any given year.

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THE IMPACT OF THE TOTAL UNFUNDED RETIREMENT LIABILITY ON INDIVIDUAL TAXPAYERS

The next chart lists the number of households and the population of each of the 20 CERL counties, using estimated 2013 figures provided by the U.S. Census Bureau. The ranking again finds Los Angeles County at the top of the list. The officially recognized unfunded liability per household for Los Angeles County is a whopping $12,123; the payment per household to eliminate this unfunded liability by 2034 is $1,190 – one may reliably surmise that the payment per taxpaying household to be considerably higher. As noted already, this liability refers only to the county workers – every resident and taxpayer also carries the prorated burden of unfunded liabilities for the local and state government employees who work in their cities, their schools, and state agencies.

Table 3 – Unfunded Liability and Payment per Household per CERL Counties ($=Millions)

20140506_Churchill-Monnett_3

Properly calculating the entire unfunded retirement liability for California’s citizens, or performing what-if analysis based on what may happen to that liability if rate-of-return projections are lowered, was not the intention of this study, but bears a final point: As shown on Table 1, the total unfunded liability for all retirement obligations is only 60% funded using official discount rates. If the pension liability is revalued at the lower 5.5% discount rate, the estimated total retirement liability swells from $179 billion to $218 billion, the estimated unfunded liability grows from $72 billion to $112 billion, and the funded ratio drops from 60% to 49%.

The CERL counties, with their independent pension systems, provide an excellent means to distill the nature of the problem to very specific and easily documented numbers and calculations. The concept of total retirement obligations, incorporating not only unfunded pension liabilities, but also debt outstanding on pension obligation bonds, and unfunded retirement healthcare obligations, yields a far more ominous profile of financial ill health than merely focusing on pensions. But it is the only accurate way to assess the cost taxpayers truly face.

*   *   *

About the Authors:

Ken Churchill is the director of New Sonoma, an organization of financial and business experts and concerned citizens dedicated to working together to solve Sonoma County’s serious financial problems. Churchill has over 40 years of business and financial management experience as founder, CEO and CFO of a solar energy company and environmental consulting firm. He sold both companies and now grows wine grapes and produces wines under his Churchill Cellars label. For the past three years, Churchill has been actively researching and studying the pension crisis and published a report titled The Sonoma County Pension Crisis – How Soaring Salaries, Retroactive Pension Increases and Poor Management Have Destroyed the County’s Finances. Churchill is currently running for supervisor, 4th district, in Sonoma County.

Bill Monnet is a board member of Citizens for Sustainable Pension Plans in Marin County.   He has an MA in Political Science from UC Davis and an MBA in Finance from UC Berkeley. Monnet was briefly an adjunct Professor of Public Administration and then spent 24 years in Silicon Valley in various management positions at IBM, Siemens and Cisco Systems. His work experience includes positions in finance, service & manufacturing operations, demand forecasting and failure analysis. He says that his varied experiences have proved surprisingly effective in understanding the counterintuitive world of public finance.

Ed Ring is the executive director for the California Policy Center. Previously, as a consultant and full-time employee primarily for start-up companies in the Silicon Valley, Ring has done financial accounting for over 20 years, and brings this expertise to his analysis and commentary on issues of public sector finance. Ring has an MBA in Finance from the University of Southern California, and a BA in Political Science from UC Davis.

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FOOTNOTES

(source data for counties listed in alphabetical order)

Alameda County

Pension Assets and Liabilities:
Alameda County CAFR 6-30-2013, Liabilities and Actuarial Value of Assets see page 64.
http://www.acgov.org/auditor/financial/cafr12-13.pdf
Alameda Employee Retirement Association Actuarial Valuation Report for 12-31-2012, Market Value of Assets see page viii.
http://www.acera.org/post/actuarial-reports

Pension Obligation Bonds (balance as of 6-30-2013):
Alameda County CAFR 6-30-2013, Outstanding Long-Term Obligations, pages 17 & 56.
http://www.acgov.org/auditor/financial/cafr12-13.pdf

Retirement Healthcare Assets and Liabilities (actuarial valuation  as of 12-31-2012):
Alameda County CAFR 6-30-2013, Outstanding Long-Term Obligations, pages 67, 70.  Alameda County has 2 separate OPEB programs:  retiree medical benefits program and a COLA + death benefit program.  The assets & liabitlies reported here are for both programs.
http://www.acgov.org/auditor/financial/cafr12-13.pdf

Contra Costa County

Pension Assets and Liabilities:
Contra Costa County CAFR 6-30-2013, Actuarial Value of assets & liabilities page 95.
http://www.co.contra-costa.ca.us/DocumentCenter/View/28970
Contra Costa County Employee Retirement Association Actuarial Valuation 12-31-2012, Actuarial & Market value of assets page 5.
http://www.cccera.org/actuarial/Actuarial Val Report 2012.pdf

Pension Obligation Bonds (actuarial valuation as of 6-30-2013):
Contra Costa County CAFR 6-30-2013, 10. Long-Term Obligations, “Pension Bonds Payable,” page 80
http://www.co.contra-costa.ca.us/DocumentCenter/View/28970

Retirement Healthcare Assets and Liabilities (actuarial valuation as of 01-01-2012):
Contra Costa County CAFR 6-30-2013, Schedule of Funding Progress, Other Postemployment benefits “Actuarial Accrued Liability,” pages 98 and 106. Note the CAFR reports the value of OPEB Assets as $114,599 as of 06-30-2013 but does not report the corresponding liability on that date. In order to have a fair matching of assets with liabilities at the same point in time I have reported the 01-01-2012 numbers.
http://www.co.contra-costa.ca.us/DocumentCenter/View/28970 

Fresno County

Pension Assets and Liabilities:
Fresno County Employees Retirement Association Actuarial Valuation 6-30-2013 [actuary = Segal], page vi.
http://www2.co.fresno.ca.us/9200/Attachments/Agendas/2014/011514/Item 27 011514 Actuarial Valuation Report as of June 30 2013.pdf 

Pension Obligation Bonds (balance as of 6-30-2013):
Fresno County CAFR 6-30-2012, POBs outstanding page 117.
http://www2.co.fresno.ca.us/0410/CAFR/CAFR2013.pdf 

Retirement Healthcare Assets and Liabilities (actuarial valuation as of 6-30-2013):
No OPEB liabilities, assets or program is reported in the CAFR.

Imperial County

Pension Assets and Liabilities:
Imperial County Employees Retirement System Actuarial Valuation 6-30-2013, page v.

Pension Obligation Bonds (balance as of 6-30-2013):
Imperial County CAFR 6-30-2012, Note 8: Long Term Debt, page 41.
http://www.co.imperial.ca.us/Budget/GeneralPurposeFinancialStatements/2013Financials.pdf

Retirement Healthcare Assets and Liabilities (actuarial valuation as of 6-30-2013):
Imperial County CAFR 6-30-2012, Note 11: OPEB, page 46.
http://www.co.imperial.ca.us/Budget/GeneralPurposeFinancialStatements/2013Financials.pdf

Kern County
Pension Assets and Liabilities:
Kern County Employees Retirement Association Actuarial Valuation 6-30-2012, page vi.
http://www.kcera.org/pdf/Actuary/2012_valuation_report.pdf

Pension Obligation Bonds (balance as of 6-30-2013):
Kern County CAFR 6-30-2013, page 61.
http://www.co.kern.ca.us/auditor/cafr/13cafr.PDF

Retirement Healthcare Assets and Liabilities (actuarial valuation as of 6-30-2012):
Kern County CAFR 6-30-2013, page 107. This includes the liabilities for both the Retiree Health Premium Supplement Program and the Retiree Health Stipend.
http://www.co.kern.ca.us/auditor/cafr/13cafr.PDF 

Los Angeles County

Pension Assets and Liabilities:
Los Angeles County Employee Retirement Association Actuarial Valuation 6-30-13 [actuary = Milliman], page 11.
http://www.lacera.com/investments/inv_pdf/actuarial_valuation.pdf

Pension Obligation Bonds (balance as of 6-30-2013):
Los Angeles County CAFR 6-30-2013. No POBs are reported in the CAFR.

Retirement Healthcare Assets and Liabilities (balance as of 7-1-2012):
Los Angeles County CAFR 6-30-2013, Other Postemployment Benefits, Retiree Health Care, page 122
http://file.lacounty.gov/auditor/portal/cms1_208825.pdf  

Marin County

Pension Assets and Liabilities:
Marin County Employees Retirement Association Actuarial Valuation 6-30-13, page 5.
http://egovwebprod.marincounty.org/depts/RT/main/reports/valuations/actuarialvaluationreport2013-06-30.pdf

Pension Obligation Bonds (balance as of 6-30-2013):
Marin County CAFR 6-30-2013, Note 8, Long-Term Obligations, Pension Obligation Bonds, page 54
http://www.marincounty.org/depts/df/~/media/Files/Departments/DF/2013_Marin%20CAFR.pdf

Retirement Healthcare Assets and Liabilities (balance as of 7-1-2013):
Marin County CAFR 6-30-2013, Schedule of Funding Progress Postemployment Healthcare, “AVA,” “AAL,” page 64
http://www.marincounty.org/depts/df/~/media/Files/Departments/DF/2013_Marin%20CAFR.pdf

Mendocino County

Pension Assets and Liabilities:
Mendocino County Employees Retirement Association Actuarial Valuation 6-30-2013, page vi.
http://www.co.mendocino.ca.us/retirement/pdf/063013Valuation.pdf

Pension Obligation Bonds (balance as of 6-30-2013):
Mendocino County CAFR 6-30-2013, Note 8: Long Term Liabilities, page 41.
http://www.co.mendocino.ca.us/auditor/pdf/2013_Mendocino_afs_-_FINAL.pdf

Retirement Healthcare Assets and Liabilities (actuarial valuation as of 6-30-2013):
Mendocino County CAFR 6-30-2013, Note 12: OPEB, page 48.
http://www.co.mendocino.ca.us/auditor/pdf/2013_Mendocino_afs_-_FINAL.pdf

Merced County

Pension Assets and Liabilities:
Merced County Employees Retirement Association Actuarial Valuation 6-30-2013, pages 2 & 5. http://www.co.merced.ca.us/documents/Retirement/Annual Reports/Valuation 2013 6 30.PDF

Pension Obligation Bonds (balance as of 6-30-2013):
Merced County CAFR 6-30-2013, Outstanding Long-Term Debt, Pension Obligation Bonds, page 14

Retirement Healthcare Assets and Liabilities (actuarial valuation as of 6-30-2013):
Merced County CAFR 6-30-2013, page 68.
http://www.co.merced.ca.us/ArchiveCenter/ViewFile/Item/456

Orange County

Pension Assets and Liabilities:
Orange County sponsors a defined benefit pension through OCERS. The OCERS plans are multi-employer plans which include sponsors not related to Orange County (e.g. City of San Juan Capistrano.) Neither the Orange County CAFR nor the OCERS Acturial Valuation separately report pension assets & liabilities by employer. However, Orange County does report that it is the largest employer in OCERS and pays 88% of sponsor payments into the plan. So, Orange County’s pension assets & liabilities are estimated as 88% of total OCERS assets & liabilities.
Orange County CAFR 6-30-2013, pages 145-146.
http://ac.ocgov.com/civicax/filebank/blobdload.aspx?BlobID=33067 
Orange County Employee Retirement Association Actuarial Valuation 12-31-12. Assets & liabilities page viii.
http://www.ocers.org/pdf/finance/actuarial/valuation/2012actuarialvaluation.pdf 

Pension Obligation Bonds (balance as of 6-30-2013):
Orange County CAFR 6-30-2013, short term POBs pages 110-111, long term POBs page 117.
http://ac.ocgov.com/civicax/filebank/blobdload.aspx?BlobID=33067 

Retirement Healthcare Assets and Liabilities (actuarial valuation as of 6-30-2011):
Orange County CAFR 6-30-2013, OPEB liability pages 155 & 159.
http://ac.ocgov.com/civicax/filebank/blobdload.aspx?BlobID=33067 

Sacramento County

Pension Assets and Liabilities:
Sacramento County CAFR 6-30-2013, Actuarial value of assets & liabilities page 100.
http://www.finance.saccounty.net/AuditorController/Documents/CAFR2013.pdf 
Sacramento County Employees Retirement Association Actuarial Valuation 6-30-2013, Actuarial & Market value of assets pages viii & 6.
http://www.retirement.saccounty.net/Documents/ActualInfo/Actuarial Valuation 2013.pdf

Pension Obligation Bonds (balance as of 6-30-2013 including accreted interest):
Sacramento County CAFR 6-30-2013, Note 9 – Long-Term Obligations, page 74
http://www.finance.saccounty.net/AuditorController/Documents/CAFR2013.pdf 

Retirement Healthcare Assets and Liabilities (actuarial valuation as of 6-30-2011):
Sacramento County CAFR 6-30-2013, OPEB assets and unfunded liabilities page 102.
http://www.finance.saccounty.net/AuditorController/Documents/CAFR2013.pdf  

San Bernardino County

Pension Assets and Liabilities:

San Bernardino County Employees Retirement Association Actuarial Valuation 6-30-2013, Market value of assets page 5, Actuarial Value of assets & liabilities page 70.
http://www.sbcera.org/Portals/0/PDFs/Actuarial Valuation and Review/2013/13_Actuarial_Valuation_Review.pdf

Pension Obligation Bonds (balance as of 6-30-2013):
San Bernardino County CAFR 6-30-2013, Direct and Overlapping General Fund Obligation Debt, pages 84 & 192.
http://www.sbcounty.gov/atc/pdf/Documents/0000_00_00_178_2012-2013%20CAFR.pdf

Retirement Healthcare Assets and Liabilities (actuarial valuation as of 6-30-2013):

San Diego County

Pension Assets and Liabilities:
San Diego County Employees Retirement Association CAFR 6-30-2013. SDCERA is a multi-employer plan. There are 5 participating employers. Separate pension and OPEB results are not reported for each employer. However, it is reported that San Diego County employees represent 95.5% and the Superior Court employees represent anothyer 4.3% of SDCERA members. So, the County owns practically all of SDCERA assets & liabilities and all are attributed here to the County. Pension liabilities and Actuarial Value of Assets page 48. Market Value of Assets page 77.
http://www.sdcera.org/investments_report.htm 
These numbers are also reported in the SDCERA Actuarial Valuation 6-30-13 on page v.
http://www.sdcera.org/PDF/June_2013_valuation.pdf

Pension Obligation Bonds (balance as of 6-30-2013):
San Diego County CAFR 6-30-2013, Taxable Pension Obligation Bonds, page 82, Table 27
http://www.sdcounty.ca.gov/auditor/annual_report13/pdf/cafr1213.pdf 

Retirement Healthcare Assets and Liabilities (actuarial valuation as of 6-30-2012):
San Diego County Employees Retirement Association CAFR 6-30-2013, page 49.
http://www.sdcera.org/investments_report.htm 

San Joaquin County

Pension Assets and Liabilities:
San Joaquin County Employees Retirement Association Actuarial Valuation 01-01-2013, pages 3 & 16.
http://www.sjcera.org/Pages/index.htm

Pension Obligation Bonds (balance as of 6-30-2013):
No POBs are reported in the CAFR.

Retirement Healthcare Assets and Liabilities (actuarial valuation as of 6-30-2013):
San Joaquin County CAFR 6-30-2013, pages 73 & 81.
http://www.sjgov.org/uploadedFiles/SJC/Departments/Auditor/Services/2012-13 SJC Financial Statements Final.pdf

San Mateo County

Pension Assets and Liabilities:
San Mateo County CAFR 6-30-2013, Actuarial Value of assets & liabilities pages 69 & 80. Balances as of 6-30-2013.
http://www.co.sanmateo.ca.us/Attachments/controller/Files/CAFR/2013CAFR.pdf
San Mateo County Employee Retirement Association Actuarial Valuation 6-30-2013 [actuary = Milliman], Market Value of assets page 11. Balance as of 6-30-2013.
http://www.samcera.org/pdf/2013valuation.pdf

Pension Obligation Bonds (balance as of 6-30-2013):
No outstanding POBs are reported in the San Mateo County CAFR.

Retirement Healthcare Assets and Liabilities (actuarial valuation as of 6-30-2013):
San Mateo County CAFR 6-30-2013, Funded Status and Funding Progress, “AAL” and “UAAL.” page 71
http://www.co.sanmateo.ca.us/Attachments/controller/Files/CAFR/2013CAFR.pdf

Santa Barbara County

Pension Assets and Liabilities:
Santa Barbara County Employees Retirement Association Actuarial Valuation 6-30-13, page 5.
http://www.countyofsb.org/uploadedFiles/sbcers/benefits/2013 Valuation.pdf

Pension Obligation Bonds (balance as of 6-30-2013):
No POBs are reported in the CAFR.

Retirement Healthcare Assets and Liabilities (actuarial valuation as of 6-30-2012):
Santa Barbara County CAFR 6-30-2013, OPEb Schedule of Funding Progress, “Actuarial Value of Assets,” “AAL,” page 106
http://countyofsb.org/uploadedFiles/auditor/Publications/1213%20CAFR.pdf

Sonoma County

Pension Assets and Liabilities:
Sonoma County Employees Retirement Association Actuarial Valuation 12-31-2012, pave viii.
http://scretire.org/uploadedFiles/SCERA/Resource_Center/News_and_Updates/2013/ActuarialValuationAsOf12-31-12.pdf

Pension Obligation Bonds (balance as of 6-30-2013):
Sonoma County CAFR 6-30-2013, Long-Term Liabilities, Pension Obligation Bonds, page 20
http://www.sonoma-county.org/auditor/financial_reports.htm
(Click on “2012-2013 Comprehensive Annual Financial Report”)

Retirement Healthcare Assets and Liabilities (balance as of 6-30-2013):
Sonoma County CAFR 6-30-2013, Schedule of Funding Progress, “AVA,” “AAL,” page 111
http://www.sonoma-county.org/auditor/financial_reports.htm
(Click on “2012-2013 Comprehensive Annual Financial Report”)

Stanislaus County

Pension Assets and Liabilities:
Stanislaus County Employees Retirement Association Actuarial Valuation 6-30-2013, page 5.
http://www.stancera.org/sites/default/files/Financials/20130630_Actuarial_Report.pdf

Pension Obligation Bonds (balance as of 6-30-2013):
Stanislaus County CAFR 6-30-2013, Note 11: Summary of Long Term Debt page 74.
http://www.stancounty.com/auditor/pdf/AFR2013.PDF

Retirement Healthcare Assets and Liabilities (actuarial valuation as of 7-1-2012):
Stanislaus County CAFR 6-30-2013, Note 19: OPEB page 91
http://www.stancounty.com/auditor/pdf/AFR2013.PDF

Tulare County

Pension Assets and Liabilities:
Tulare County Employees Retirement Association Actuarial Valuation 6-30-2013, page 1.
http://www.tcera.org/Publications.php

Pension Obligation Bonds (balance as of 6-30-2013):
Tulare County CAFR 6-30-2013. There was no balance due on any POB as of 6-30-2013.
http://tularecounty.ca.gov/auditorcontroller/index.cfm/auditor-controller/financial-reports1/comprehensive-annual-financial-report-cafr/cafr-2012-2013/

Retirement Healthcare Assets and Liabilities (actuarial valuation as of 6-30-2012):
Tulare County CAFR 6-30-2013, pages 71 & 78.
http://tularecounty.ca.gov/auditorcontroller/index.cfm/auditor-controller/financial-reports1/comprehensive-annual-financial-report-cafr/cafr-2012-2013/ 

Ventura County

Pension Assets and Liabilities:
Ventura County Employees Retirement Association Actuarial Valuation 6-30-13, page vi
http://vcportal.ventura.org/VCERA/docs/publications/Actuarial_Valuation_as_of_June_30_2013.pdf

Pension Obligation Bonds (balance as of 6-30-2013):
No POBs are reported in the CAFR.

Retirement Healthcare Assets and Liabilities (actuarial valuation as of 6-30-2013):
Ventura County CAFR 6-30-2013, page 100
http://www.ventura.org/auditor-controller/comprehensive-annual-financial-report-2013