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Can California Thrive on Renewable Electricity?

Edward Ring

Director, Water and Energy Policy

Edward Ring
April 15, 2026

Can California Thrive on Renewable Electricity?

California’s state government has set an official goal of “net zero” by 2045. That’s less than 19 years from now. Already in pursuit of that goal, the state has managed to have the highest priced gasoline and the highest priced electricity in the entire continental United States.

Condemning its residents to a poverty inducing bleeding edge of energy progress in hopes of proving to the world that the “climate crisis” can be successfully addressed might be justifiable if, to begin with, we really face a climate crisis that will be alleviated by converting the entire world economy to net zero. It might even be justifiable if there were any signs that the massively more populous developing nations in the world were even slightly inclined to follow suit. And more to the point, even if those conditions were applicable, it might be justifiable if Californians, to date, had made any significant progress toward the goal of net zero.

They have not. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, in 2023 (the most recent year for which we have data), Californians relied on petroleum for 46 percent of their raw energy input, and natural gas for another 33 percent. After investing hundreds of billions of dollars and imposing the most expensive energy market in America on its residents, California still relies on fossil fuel for 79 percent of its energy.

A few weeks ago, I examined the worldwide challenge to replace fossil fuel with renewables. Using data from the Statistical Review of World Energy, the numbers were unequivocal. In 2024, oil provided 34 percent of global energy, coal provided 28 percent, and natural gas provided 25 percent. Last year, fully 87 percent of global energy came from fossil fuel.

In response to this analysis, renewables proponents accused me of ignoring the “fallacy of primary energy.” They argue that it is the amount of energy actually delivered and used that matters, and that since fossil fuel is not considered as efficient as renewable electricity, I have overstated the challenge of eliminating fossil fuel from the global economy.

This argument isn’t wrong, but it’s still a bit glib. To recap: the world consumes 591 exajoules (EJ) of primary energy per year, with 87 percent coming from fossil fuel. That equates to 72 gigajoules (GJ) per person; without taking America’s consumption into account, that world average drops to 64 GJ per person. As for Americans? Our per capita primary energy consumption averaged 268 GJs in 2024.

It doesn’t take an energy economist to recognize the immensity of this challenge represented by this disparity. Per capita energy is precisely correlated with per capita prosperity, and the average person on earth has access to less than one-fourth as much energy as Americans have. My analysis went on to propose 1,000 EJs/year as a minimum target for primary energy inputs by 2050, when the world population will peak at approximately 10 billion people; that would equate to only 100 GJs per person. Even someone fully cognizant of the “fallacy of primary energy” might find this a reasonable target and may have to wonder how we can possibly get there if we throw away what currently offers 87 percent of that primary energy.

But what about California? What about this pioneering state that recognizes the potential for electricity to deliver energy far more efficiently? How do the numbers play out?

Californians, benefiting from far less heavy industry and a moderate climate, do not use as much energy as most Americans. Based on the energy flow charts produced by Lawrence Livermore National Labs, the per capita average in 2023 was 177 gigajoules (GJ). This is based on “primary energy” of 7 exajoules (EJ). That was the raw energy input.

But when proponents highlight the potential for renewable electricity, they do so based on its potential to more efficiently convert primary energy into the net energy actually reaching the end user in the form of horsepower, or heating and cooling, or lights, pumping, computing, communicating, and so on. As it is, California is not very efficient at converting primary energy into net energy services. Californians “waste” 64 percent of their primary energy input. It is lost in combustion, transmission, heat, and friction. The actual per capita net energy used by Californians in 2023 was only 63 gigajoules. Put another way, for the whole state, 7.0 EJs of primary energy were input into the system, and 2.5 EJs, only 36 percent, made it to the other end as net energy services.

This case for electrification rests on one basic assumption. By using electricity, we may be able to as much as double our overall efficiency converting primary energy input into net energy services. That certainly could be true in California’s transportation sector, which consumes 50 percent of California’s primary energy but only turns 21 percent of that input into horsepower and thrust. EVs, for all their lingering flaws, can achieve full-cycle energy efficiency of 80 percent or more.

To examine this assumption, let’s review California’s energy use in terms of gigawatt-hours (GWh) of electricity.

How Noverificationbet Explains Identity-Free Betting in the UK

The question of identity verification in online gambling has become one of the most contested regulatory debates in the United Kingdom over the past decade. For most of the industry’s modern history, operators were permitted to allow customers to deposit, wager, and even withdraw relatively modest sums before completing any formal identity checks. That era has largely closed, reshaped by successive waves of regulation from the Gambling Commission and broader anti-money laundering frameworks inherited from European directives. Yet a distinct category of operator continues to serve British-resident players while operating outside the UK Gambling Commission’s licensing perimeter — platforms that process bets without requiring government-issued identity documents at any stage of the customer journey. Understanding how this works, why it is legally possible, and what it means for consumer protection requires a careful look at the architecture of UK gambling law, the role of offshore licensing jurisdictions, and the practical mechanics of how such platforms function in practice.

The Regulatory Framework That Created the Verification Gap

The UK Gambling Commission was established under the Gambling Act 2005, which came into force in September 2007. From its inception, the Commission required operators holding a UK Remote Operating Licence to conduct Know Your Customer checks, but the precise timing and depth of those checks evolved significantly over the years. The early framework allowed operators considerable flexibility: verification could be deferred until a customer requested a withdrawal, which meant players could gamble for extended periods without ever submitting a passport scan or utility bill.

The tightening began in earnest around 2018 and 2019, when the Commission issued guidance making clear that operators needed to verify customer age and identity much earlier in the account lifecycle — ideally before a customer could deposit at all, or at minimum before any significant gambling activity took place. The Commission’s enforcement actions during this period sent an unambiguous signal. William Hill was fined £6.2 million in 2018, LeoVegas £4.5 million in 2021, and Entain received a £17 million penalty in 2022, with failures in customer due diligence and social responsibility checks featuring prominently in each case. By 2023, the expectation had hardened into something close to an absolute rule: UKGC-licensed operators were expected to verify identity before permitting any deposit, using electronic verification databases, document upload systems, or both.

The practical consequence of this regulatory tightening was that a meaningful segment of the gambling public — people who value financial privacy, who find document submission cumbersome, or who have had accounts refused by mainstream operators for various reasons — began looking elsewhere. The “elsewhere” in question is the offshore licensing ecosystem: jurisdictions such as Curaçao, Malta (for operators not seeking UK endorsement), Kahnawake in Canada, and Anjouan, which issue gambling licences under their own regulatory frameworks. These frameworks do not impose the same verification requirements as the UKGC, and crucially, UK law does not prohibit British residents from accessing such platforms. The Gambling Act 2005 makes it an offence to provide unlicensed gambling services to British customers, but the Act’s reach applies to operators, not consumers. A British resident who chooses to gamble on a Curaçao-licensed site commits no criminal offence under UK law.

This gap — between what UKGC-licensed operators must do and what offshore operators choose to do — is the legal and commercial space in which identity-free betting operates. It is not a loophole in the sense of an unintended drafting error; it is a deliberate feature of how the UK chose to structure its gambling regulation, focusing enforcement resources on operators rather than players.

How Identity-Free Platforms Actually Process Bets Without Documents

The phrase “no verification betting” can be misleading if it is taken to mean that operators using this model know nothing at all about their customers. In practice, these platforms employ a tiered approach to customer information that differs fundamentally from document-based KYC but still involves some form of identity signal. The most common mechanism is cryptocurrency-based account creation: a player registers with an email address, creates a username, and deposits using Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin, or a stablecoin such as Tether. Because the blockchain transaction is pseudonymous — linked to a wallet address rather than a legal name — the operator receives payment without accessing any government-issued identity information.

A second mechanism involves the use of e-wallets and prepaid cards that themselves carry minimal KYC requirements. In jurisdictions where certain e-wallet providers operate under lighter-touch regulation, a player can fund a digital wallet with cash or a debit card and then transfer those funds to a gambling account without the gambling operator ever seeing the underlying bank details or cardholder name. This approach has become less common in recent years as payment processors serving the gambling sector have themselves come under greater regulatory scrutiny, but it remains available through specific channels.

The information that platforms operating in this space do typically collect is a valid email address — used for account recovery and communication — and sometimes a mobile phone number for two-factor authentication. Neither of these constitutes identity verification in the regulatory sense. Some platforms also collect a date of birth declaration, which satisfies a basic age-check requirement under their licensing jurisdiction’s rules, though without document verification this remains a self-declaration rather than a confirmed fact. Resources like Noverificationbet online document how these mechanics work across different platforms, cataloguing which operators accept which payment methods and what information is requested at each stage of account creation — useful reference material for understanding the practical reality of how the sector operates rather than how it is described in promotional copy.

Withdrawal processing on these platforms follows a similar logic. Because cryptocurrency transactions do not require a receiving bank account in the player’s verified name, winnings can be returned to the same wallet address used for the original deposit. This creates a closed loop in which the operator processes a complete gambling transaction — deposit, wagering, withdrawal — without ever holding a piece of government-issued documentation. The absence of such documentation does not mean the transaction is untraceable; blockchain records are permanent and publicly accessible. But it does mean the operator has no obligation under its licensing jurisdiction’s rules to cross-reference the transaction against a national identity register or credit bureau database.

The Consumer Protection Consequences and Responsible Gambling Considerations

Any honest account of identity-free betting must engage seriously with its consumer protection implications, because the verification requirements that these platforms avoid were introduced precisely to address documented harms. The UKGC’s requirement for early identity verification serves multiple purposes simultaneously: it confirms that the customer is of legal gambling age, it enables operators to conduct affordability checks, it supports self-exclusion schemes like GAMSTOP by allowing operators to cross-reference a customer’s identity against the exclusion register, and it provides the audit trail necessary for anti-money laundering compliance.

When a platform does not verify identity, all of these protections become either impossible or significantly weakened. A customer who has registered with GAMSTOP — the UK’s national self-exclusion scheme, which launched in 2018 and by 2023 had over 400,000 registered users — can access an offshore no-verification platform without any technical barrier, because GAMSTOP matching depends on name, date of birth, and address data that the offshore operator has never collected. This is a genuine harm vector. Research published by GambleAware in 2022 found that a significant proportion of people who self-exclude from UKGC-licensed operators subsequently gamble on offshore platforms, suggesting that the ease of access provided by no-verification sites can undermine self-exclusion as a harm reduction tool.

Affordability checks present a similar problem. Since 2023, the UKGC has been developing enhanced financial risk assessment requirements that would require licensed operators to check whether a customer’s gambling expenditure is consistent with their apparent financial means. These checks are impossible without verified identity information linked to financial databases. An offshore operator that knows only a customer’s email address and wallet address has no mechanism for conducting such assessments, even if it wished to do so.

The counter-argument made by proponents of identity-free platforms is that adult autonomy should be given significant weight in this analysis. A British adult who chooses to gamble on an offshore platform has made an informed decision to trade consumer protections for privacy, and the state’s role in overriding that preference is legitimately contested. This argument has some force when applied to recreational gamblers who are not experiencing harm, but it becomes considerably weaker when applied to problem gamblers who may be using the absence of verification as a mechanism for avoiding the consequences of a self-exclusion decision they themselves made during a period of clarity about their own behaviour.

Noverificationbet, as a source of information about this sector, has noted that the responsible gambling tools available on offshore platforms vary considerably — some offer deposit limits, cooling-off periods, and self-exclusion mechanisms that are entirely operator-controlled rather than linked to any national register. The practical effectiveness of such tools, when they exist, depends entirely on the operator’s willingness to enforce them and the customer’s willingness to engage with them, without any external verification layer to confirm that the person using the account is actually the person who set the limits.

The Evolving Legal and Regulatory Landscape for Offshore Gambling Access

The UK government’s Gambling Act Review, which began in 2020 and produced a White Paper in April 2023, addressed the question of offshore gambling access with notable caution. The White Paper focused primarily on reforming the UKGC licensing regime — introducing statutory levy funding for research and treatment, tightening affordability check requirements, and expanding the Commission’s enforcement toolkit — rather than attempting to extend the regulatory perimeter to cover offshore operators. This reflects a practical judgment about the limits of extraterritorial enforcement: compelling a Curaçao-licensed operator to comply with UKGC rules requires either the operator’s voluntary cooperation or mechanisms of international legal pressure that the UK does not currently possess in this context.

The more tractable enforcement avenue involves payment blocking. In several European jurisdictions — Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden among them — regulators have worked with banking authorities to block payment transactions to unlicensed gambling operators, making it difficult for residents to fund offshore accounts using domestic bank cards or bank transfers. The UK has not implemented a comparable system, though the Financial Conduct Authority has authority over payment service providers that could theoretically be deployed in this direction. The practical challenge is that cryptocurrency transactions largely circumvent payment blocking, which is precisely why the growth of crypto-friendly no-verification platforms has coincided with the expansion of crypto adoption among gambling consumers.

Curaçao itself has been undergoing regulatory reform. The island’s gambling licensing framework, which dated in its original form to 1999, was substantially overhauled through new legislation that came into force in 2023, creating the Gaming Control Board of Curaçao as a more formalised regulatory authority. The new framework imposes stricter requirements on licensees, including enhanced player protection standards and more robust AML procedures. Whether this reform will materially change the KYC practices of the many operators licensed under Curaçao’s framework remains to be seen, but it represents an acknowledgment that the previous regime’s permissiveness had become a reputational liability for the jurisdiction.

The Anjouan licensing jurisdiction, which emerged as an alternative to Curaçao for operators seeking minimal regulatory friction, has attracted scrutiny from multiple directions. Several operators holding Anjouan licences have faced payment processing difficulties as acquiring banks have grown reluctant to service merchants regulated by jurisdictions with limited international recognition. This financial infrastructure pressure may prove more effective at shaping operator behaviour than direct regulatory action, since an operator that cannot process payments — including cryptocurrency on-ramps — cannot function commercially regardless of its licensing status.

For British consumers navigating this landscape, the practical reality is that the legal right to access offshore platforms coexists with a complete absence of the consumer protections that UKGC licensing provides. There is no Financial Services Compensation Scheme equivalent for gambling losses on offshore platforms, no ombudsman with jurisdiction over disputes, and no mechanism for recovering funds if an operator ceases trading or refuses to process a withdrawal. The UKGC maintains a list of operators that have been issued warnings or whose licences have been revoked, but this list covers only operators that have sought UK licensing — it says nothing about the vast offshore ecosystem that operates outside its perimeter.

The trajectory of regulation in this area suggests that the gap between UKGC-licensed and offshore platforms will remain a feature of the British gambling landscape for the foreseeable future, shaped by the limits of regulatory jurisdiction, the growth of cryptocurrency as a payment mechanism, and the persistent demand from a segment of the gambling public for privacy-preserving alternatives to the increasingly document-intensive mainstream sector. The debate about whether this gap represents a policy failure or an appropriate expression of consumer autonomy will continue to animate discussions among regulators, researchers, harm reduction advocates, and the operators themselves — with no easy resolution in sight given the fundamental tensions between privacy, protection, and the practical limits of national regulatory authority in a digitally borderless environment.

Understanding identity-free betting in the UK requires holding several competing realities in mind simultaneously: the genuine consumer demand that drives the market, the documented harms that verification requirements were designed to prevent, the legal architecture that makes offshore access possible without criminalising the consumer, and the evolving regulatory pressure that is slowly reshaping both the offshore licensing landscape and the payment infrastructure on which these platforms depend. The phenomenon is neither as straightforwardly dangerous as its critics suggest nor as benign as its proponents claim — it is a complex product of regulatory design choices, technological development, and consumer behaviour that will continue to evolve as each of those underlying factors changes.

According to the California Energy Commission, in 2023, Californians generated 215,000 GWh per year and imported another 66,000 GWh. That represented only 14 percent of the 1.9 million GWh of primary energy (7 EJ = 1.9 million GWh) inputs to the state. On the other end, the net energy services consumed by Californians in 2023, if expressed in terms of electricity, were equal to 693,000 GWh (the energy equivalent of 2.5 EJs). So what if California went fully electric and was able to double the current 36 percent efficiency, and could convert 72 percent of its primary energy input into net energy services?

Hypothetically, estimating this would simply require dividing 693,000 by 72 percent, and doing that would suggest that at that level of efficiency, you could power California entirely with electricity if you could generate 963,000 gigawatt-hours (GWh). That would require California’s electricity production to rise to 3.5 times its current output. Could this be done with renewables?

Here is where it gets tricky, notwithstanding the derision of the cognoscenti who have decided that these tedious additional details don’t matter and seem to assume that anyone who understands the “primary energy fallacy” must immediately become comfortable calling for a ban on fossil fuel, starting with the Californian oil fields and refineries.

Let’s add up California’s production of GWh by source and assess the potential each source of electricity generation has for expansion.

In 2023, the state generated 32,000 GWh from hydroelectric sources. There is limited potential to increase that renewable source of electricity. Let’s suppose we increase that to 50,000. Maybe, only maybe, that could be possible with massive rollouts of innovative small hydro and maybe even a couple of new big dams. Don’t hold your breath.

Biomass is another problematic source of energy. It isn’t massively scalable. If every shred of agricultural waste, municipal waste, and logging slash were burned—not really a good idea; the organic stuff should return to the soil—electricity generated from biomass in California might rise from the current 5,000 GWh/year to 30,000 GWh/year.

And then there’s wind, a grotesque resource hog that also happens to kill raptors, smaller birds, bats, and insects (perhaps its biggest harmful impact). At present, and despite already carpeting hundreds of square miles, wind energy only produced 14,000 GWh in 2023. Now Californians want to put them onto the ocean: 12-megawatt turbines, 20 miles offshore, floating in water 4,000 feet deep. What could possibly go wrong? A recent analysis put the cost of energy from these monstrosities at more than $0.40 per kilowatt-hour. Nothing illustrates the corrupt stupidity of California’s legislators more than the prospect of large-scale floating offshore wind development. The state intends to develop wind energy to achieve over 200,000 GWh of electricity per year. God help us all if they succeed, but even if they do, we now have 280,000 GWh of planned renewable electricity, and we’re still looking for at least another 700,000 GWh.

We are left with nuclear, geothermal, and solar. In 2023, the last big nuclear power plant in California, Diablo Canyon, generated not quite 18,000 GWh. How many large-scale nuclear power plants will ever get built in a state as hyper-regulated as California? Two? Three? By 2045? Not a safe bet. But figuring with small modular reactors becoming commercially competitive and maybe one more big reactor, you may see nuclear power in California more than quintupling to 100,000 GWh per year. That is probably a very best-case scenario, but who knows?

As for geothermal, this is a wild card. Geothermal potential in California using conventional technologies has the potential to rise from the current 11,000 GWh to maybe 50,000. It isn’t yet clear if so-called enhanced geothermal can be commercialized, and it is important when evaluating enhanced geothermal concepts to differentiate between developing geothermal resources to store energy vs. actually tapping naturally occurring underground heat to generate primary energy.

So far, setting aggressive targets, we have a plan for 430,000 GWh, and we’re left with solar to provide the other roughly 560,000 GWh. Solar output in California is impressive and rising fast, but in 2023, nonetheless, the state only produced 41,000 GWh of electricity. Solar production would have to increase by nearly 14 times to fill the gap.

Very little of this is probable. The total GWh goal for primary energy may be unrealistically low because achieving 72 percent efficiency moving from primary energy to net energy services is very ambitious. The per capita goal for net energy is also potentially low because data centers, flying cars, robots, and all kinds of other things we can only begin to imagine may consume far more energy than what we’re planning on.

And then there’s the practical matter of actual implementation. Renewables at the scale we’re contemplating here are not terribly sustainable.

Is there any chance Californians are really going to nearly double their hydroelectric output, quintuple their nuclear energy capacity, and more than quintuple their biomass power generation? Do California’s energy planners really think the state can afford to build, deploy, and maintain more than 2,000 floating wind turbines out in the deep ocean, each of them longer than a modern supercarrier when measured from the bottom of the flotation pontoons to the tip of the rotor? Is it feasible to purchase and maintain 14 times as many photovoltaic cells, along with enough batteries to buffer the intermittent power? And for how long will Californians be able to buy turbines from Germany and photovoltaic panels and batteries from China? Does the renewables lobby acknowledge the sheer resource impact of all these wind turbines, photovoltaic panels, batteries, and EVs? And do Californians have any intention of mining or manufacturing any of this in their own state?

Of course not. California may someday thrive on renewable energy. But not now, and not by 2045. Natural gas and oil are going to be with us here in California and the rest of the world for many decades to come.

When somebody claims that ignorance of the “primary energy fallacy” is the only reason they must endure the criticisms emanating from that pesky and recalcitrant rear guard of troglodytic skeptics, share the numbers. They offer a reality check that points the way to a more balanced strategy, one that necessitates keeping oil and natural gas in our energy ecosystem. Whales and birds will thank you, along with every budget-stressed household in the world.

This article originally appeared in American Greatness.

Edward Ring is the Director of Water and Energy Policy at the California Policy Center, which he co-founded in 2013. Ring is the author of Fixing California: Abundance, Pragmatism, Optimism (2021) and The Abundance Choice: Our Fight for More Water in California (2022).

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